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Vila: Constitutional Law: Thou Shalt Not Establish Religion

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THOU SHALT NOT ESTABLISH
RELIGION
Glassrothv. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003)
Monica Vila

"

Appellant, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, erected a
two-and-one-half ton monument of the Ten Commandments in the rotunda
of the Alabama State Judicial Building.' The monument, which Appellant
installed to reflect the moral foundation of law, was also engraved with
quotations from secular sources and adorned the rotunda along with two
other displays.' Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama,3 alleging that Appellant's actions were
unconstitutional.4 Finding that Appellant's purpose in displaying the
monument was non-secular and that the monument's primary effect was
to advance religion, the district court concluded that Appellant's actions
were unconstitutional. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the

* To my parents, Peter and Marta, and my sister, Lizette, for whose constant
encouragement I am deeply grateful.
** Editor'sNote: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam Award for the best
Case Comment written during Spring 2004.
1. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). The 5,280-pound granite
monument is in the shape of a cube, approximately three feet wide by three feet deep by four feet
tall. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 2002). The top of the monument
is carved as two sloping tablets with rounded tops, similar to an open Bible resting on a lectern. Id.
at 1294-95. The tablets are engraved with the Ten Commandments, excerpted from the King James
Bible. Id. Each side of the monument depicts quotations from secular sources. Id. at 1295. The
monument is located directly across from the main entrance to the judicial building. Id. at 1294.
The rotunda also contains a marble plaque with quotations from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Frederick Douglass and a brass plaque with the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1296. The district court noted,
however, that a person standing directly in front of the monument cannot see either plaque. Id.
2. Glassroth,335 F.3d at 1286-87.
3. Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290. The three Appellees are practicing attorneys in the
Alabama courts. Glassroth,335 F.3dat 1288. The instant court concluded that two Appellees, who
altered their behavior as a result of the monument, had standing to bring the suit against Appellant.
Id. at 1292. The court thus found it unnecessary to determine whether the third Appellee also had
standing. Id at 1293.
4. Glassroth,335 F.3d at 1288. Appellees sought a declaratory judgment that Appellant's
actions were unconstitutional and an injunction to remove the monument. Id.
5. Id. After Appellant declined to remove the monument voluntarily within thirty days of
the district court's judgment, the district court entered an order enjoining him from failing to
remove the monument from the public areas of the Judicial Building. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and HELD that
Appellant's display violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment6 by purposely acknowledging the Judeo-Christian God and
suggesting that the state endorsed Christianity.!
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."8
The language of the Establishment Clause, however, offers little guidance
regarding its application.9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has attempted
to define the scope of the clause by employing several tests and
standards.' 0
In Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test
for determining whether government action violates the Establishment
Clause.12 In Lemon, the Court considered whether from two states statutes
providing state aid to church-related elementary schools were
unconstitutional. 3 The Rhode Island act authorized a fifteen-percent salary
supplement to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools. 4 The
Pennsylvania act authorized reimbursement to nonpublic schools for
certain secular education services, including teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and instructional material. 5 Both statutes contained restrictions to
guarantee that secular and religious educational functions remained
separate and to ensure that state financial aid supported only secular
functions.'6

6. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
7. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296-97.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("The language of the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment is at best opaque .... ).
10. The Supreme Court has varied its Establishment Clausejurisprudence by employing the
Lemon test, Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612, the historical test, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790
(1983), the endorsement test, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985), and the coercion test, Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). In fact, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court has
"repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. id. at 612-13.
13. Id. at606.
14. Id. at 607. The three-judge court found that Rhode Island's nonpublic elementary schools
accommodated approximately twenty-five percent of the state's pupils, ninety-five percent of
whom attended schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. ld at 608.
15. Id. at 609. Pennsylvania entered into contracts with schools comprising more than twenty
percent of all pupils in the state. Id. at 610. More than ninety-six percent of these pupils attended
church-related schools, most of which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Id.
16. id at 613.
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The Court analyzed the statutes under its newly formulated three-part
test. 7 To withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Establishment Clause,
the statute first must have a secular purpose."8 Second, its primary effect
must neither be to advance nor inhibit religion.' 9 Finally, it must not
excessively entangle the government with religion.2"
The Court noted that the legislative intent of the statutes was not to
advance religion but rather to enhance the quality of secular education in
all schools.2 Nonetheless, the Court found that continuous state
surveillance and policing was necessary to ensure compliance with the
restrictions of the statutes.22 Because they fostered an intimate relationship
between church and state,23 the statutes failed the third part of the test.
Accordingly, the Court held that both statutes violated the Establishment
Clause.24
Despite the prevailing Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon, in
Marsh v. Chambers25 the Court declined to apply or address it, employing
instead a historical analysis.26 In Marsh, the Court considered whether the
Nebraska legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer led
by a state-employed chaplain was unconstitutional.27 Noting that such
practice is "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country, 28
the Court provided a historical account of legislative prayer by paid
chaplains. 29 Because the draftsmen of the First Amendment also engaged

17. Id. at 612-13.
18. Id. at 612.
19. Id. Subsequent courts have further defined the second part of the Lemon test in terms of
whether a reasonable observer would perceive the practice in question as endorsing religion.
Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (citing County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
20. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 619-22.
23. Id. at 622. The Court explained that excessive entanglement can also arise out of the
"divisive political potential" of a state statute or program. Id. at 622.
24. Id. at 609, 611.
25. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
26. Id. at 790-9 1.Marsh was the first instance since Lemon where the Supreme Court did not
resort to a three-part test in deciding an Establishment Clause case. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). The appellate court did apply Lemon, however, and
concluded that the practice violated all three parts of the test. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228,
234-35 (8th Cir. 1982).
27. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.
28. Id. at 786.
29. Id. at 787-89. The Continental Congress, beginning in 1774, adopted the traditional
practice of opening its sessions with a prayer offered by a paid chaplain. Id. at 787. The First
Congress also adopted the practice of selecting a chaplain to open each session with a prayer. Id.
at 787-88. Three days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid chaplains, final agreement
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in prayer in the First Congress, the Court reasoned, the Establishment
Clause cannot be interpreted to find the challenged action
unconstitutional. °
According significant weight to the unbroken, two-hundred-year
practice of legislative prayer,3 the Court explained that invoking divine
guidance on a public lawmaking body is not an establishment of religion.32
Rather, the Court characterized the practice as a recognition of beliefs
widely held by the people of this country.33 The Court thus held that
Nebraska's chaplaincy practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.34
Subsequently, in Lynch v. Donnelly,35 the Court returned to the settled
principles of Lemon, although it applied a relaxed version of the test. 6 In
Lynch, the Court considered whether the Establishment Clause prohibited
a city from including a nativity scene in its annual Christmas display.37 In
addition to the nativity scene, the display contained figures of Santa Claus
and reindeer, a Christmas tree, carolers, and colored lights.3"
Before delving into Lemon's three-part inquiry,39 however, the Court
engaged in a historical analysis.40 The Court stated that "[t]here is an
was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights. Id.
at 788.
30. Id.
at 788, 791. In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that had the Courtjudged legislative
prayer under Lemon, the Court would have struck it down as a clear violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 790. The Court stated, "'It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our
entire national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice.., is not something to
be lightly cast aside."' Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)) (alteration in
original).
32. Id. at 792.
33. Id.
Emphasizing that religion is deeply embedded in our society, the Court cited Justice
Douglas's earlier observation that "[we] are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952)).
34. Id.
at 786.
35. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
36. Id.
at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
at 670-71.
38. Id.
at 671.
39. See supratext accompanying notes 17-20 (explaining Lemon's three-part test).
40. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-78. The Court began its historical analysis by observing that,
beginning in the early Colonial Period, "a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious
holiday to give thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God." Id at 675. The Court
proceeded to state that "Executive Orders and other official announcements of Presidents and of
the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious
terms." Id.
at 676. The country's religious heritage is also evident in the national motto, "In God
We Trust," and in the language of the Pledge of Allegiance, according to the Court. Id.
Lastly, the
Court indicated that art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Id.For example, the National Gallery in Washington "has long
exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably the Last Supper, and paintings depicting
the Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection." Id.at 676-77.
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unbroken history of official acknowledgement by... [the] government of
the role of religion in America[]."' The Court further noted that the
nativity scene represents a historic religious event which has been
acknowledged in the Western World for twenty centuries and in this
country for two centuries. 2 The Court rejected the proposed interpretation
of the Establishment Clause as requiring a 'wall' between church and
state. ' 43
Additionally, the Court characterized Lemon's three-part test as merely
"useful" in determining what constitutes permissible action under the
Establishment Clause."4 In evaluating whether the display satisfied
Lemon's first part, the Court clarified that Lemon does not require an
"exclusively secular" purpose. 45 Rather, the Court noted that any secular
purpose, such as celebrating the holiday and depicting the holiday's origin,
is sufficient under Lemon, regardless of the display's religious nature.46
The Court then evaluated whether the display's primary effect was to
advance religion,47 concluding that the display had merely a remote and
indirect effect on religion.48 Lastly, the Court determined that neither the
content nor maintenance of the display engendered continuous contact
with church authorities, and it thereby avoided excessive entanglement
between government and religion.49 Finding that the display satisfied all

41. Id. at 674.
42. Id at 685-86.
43. Id. at 673 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)). The concept of a
"wall" of separation was coined by Thomas Jefferson in his letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jefferson was
in France at the time the Bill of Rights was passed by Congress and ratified by the States. Id at 92
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Consequently, Justice Rehnquist refers to him as a "less than ideal
source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment."
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. Moreover, the Court recognized that it has repeatedly been
unwilling to confine itself to a single test in this area. Id. Although the majority noted that the
objective in Establishment Clause cases is to prevent unnecessary intrusion of the church and state
upon one another, it conceded that absolute separation of the two is neither possible nor required
by the Constitution. Id at 672-73.
45. See id.
at 681 n.6.
46. Id. at681.
47. Id. at 681-83.
48. Id. at 683. The Court analogized this case to Marsh, noting that the display of the nativity
scene is "no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Congressional and
Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of
literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums." Id.
49. Id.
at 684. The Court also rejected the argument that excessive entanglement resulted in
this case from political divisiveness. Id.Specifically, the Court stated, "A litigant cannot, by the
very act of commencing a lawsuit, however, create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit
it as evidence of entanglement." Id.at 684-85.
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three parts of the Lemon test, the Court upheld its constitutionality.5"
However, the Court's decision seemed to be based primarily on its
historical analysis."
While the instant court addressed Marsh's applicability to the instant
case, it nonetheless applied the Lemon test52 in determining that
Appellant's action violated the Establishment Clause.53 Before proceeding
with its analysis under Lemon, however, the court acknowledged that
Lemon's three-part test, although the prevailing doctrine, has received
much criticism.54 The instant court first concluded that Appellant's
purpose in displaying the monument was not secular.55 Rejecting
Appellant's argument that the Ten Commandments as presented in the
monument held purely secular relevance,56 the court based its conclusion
primarily upon Appellant's words.57 While Appellant argued that the

monument depicted the moral foundation of law, the court found it was
ultimately an inherently religious monument, thereby failing the first part
of the Lemon test.5"

50. Id. at 685.
51. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 n.5 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
52. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297-98 (l1th Cir. 2003); see supra text
accompanying notes 17-20.
53. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295-97.
54. Id. at 1296. "The three-part test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding
Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to realize." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296-97.
56. Id. at 1296. The district court conceded that the Ten Commandments have a secular
aspect. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1300 (M.D. Ala. 2002). Experts testified that the
Ten Commandments were a foundation of American law and that America's founders relied upon
the Ten Commandments as a source of absolute moral standards. Id. Nonetheless, the court
considered the sacred aura of the monument to be overwhelming. Id.
57. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296. The court gave significant consideration to Appellant's
words both at the monument's unveiling ceremony and at trial. Id. At the unveiling ceremony,
Appellant remarked:
By the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the State of Alabama as
Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court,... I'm pleased to present this
monument depicting the moral foundation of our law.
...By placement of this monument in the rotunda housing [of] the Alabama
Supreme Court, ... this monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and
judges of the circuit and district courts of this state.... of the truth stated in the
preamble of the Alabama Constitution, that in order to establish justice, we must
invoke "the favor and guidance of Almighty God."
Glasroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1321-22. At trial, Appellant admitted that his purpose in installing the
monument was to acknowledge God's law and God's sovereignty, specifically the God of the Holy
Scripture. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1287.
58. Glassroth,335 F.3d at 1295-97.
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The instant court further analyzed whether the primary effect of
Appellant's display was to advance religion. 9 Opining that nothing on the
monument de-emphasized its religious nature, the court concluded that a
reasonable observer would feel as though the State of Alabama were
endorsing Christianity.' The instant court thus stated that Appellant's
display failed the second part of the Lemon test.6 Ending its analysis under
Lemon at the second part, the court concluded that the display violated the
Establishment Clause.62
Although it recognized that Marsh's historical test is an alternative
standard by which to decide Establishment Clause cases, 63 the instant court
engaged in a narrow reading of Marsh." The court maintained that there
was no evidence of an "'unbroken history"' of displaying religious
symbols in judicial buildings.65 The court concluded, therefore, that Marsh
did not validate Appellant's display." Additionally, the instant court
heeded the Supreme Court's warning against a broad reading of Marsh,67
insisting that "Marsh plainly does not stand for the sweeping
proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years old and their
equivalents are constitutional today."6 '
In analyzing whether Appellant's display of the Ten Commandments
violated the Establishment Clause, the instant court redefined Lemon,
overlooked similarities with Lynch, and misconstrued Marsh.While Lynch
suggested that the Lemon test is only a useful guideline,69 the instant court
mechanically applied Lemon, paying little, if any, attention to its
limitations.7 ° Furthermore, the instant court inverted Lynch's interpretation

59. Id. at 1297; see supra note 19.
60. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1297.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1298.
Id.
Id. (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)).
Id.

67. Id. Appellant insisted that Marsh be read more broadly, claiming that the issue turns on
"whether the monument's acknowledgements of God as the source of law and liberty in America
parallel similar acknowledgements of God at the time of America's founding."' Id. (quoting Brief
for Appellant at 44, Glassroth, 335 F.3d 1282).

68. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989)) (alteration in
original).
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112
(1985) ("In Lynch we reiterated that the Lemon test has never been binding on the Court....").
70. See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295-96. For Lemon's limitations, see, for example,
TangipahoaParishBd. ofEduc. v. Freiler,530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari) (citing instances in which Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed disapproval of Lemon); see also County ofAllegheny, 492
U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace,
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of the first part of the Lemon test.7 ' Lynch suggested that only a secular
purpose is needed to satisfy the first part of Lemon.72 However, despite the
strong evidence in the record of the secular relevance of the Ten
Commandments,73 the instant court treated its religious aspect as a per se
violation of Lemon.74 The instant court therefore redefined Lemon's first
part, requiring that the display have an exclusively secular purpose.7 5
Additionally, the instant court overlooked facts which may have
warranted an alternative result. Concluding that the display also violated
the second part of the Lemon test, the instant court based its finding on the
monument's placement and physical characteristics. 7 6 The court drew a
somewhat unconvincing distinction between the display in the instant case
and that in Lynch to justify its conclusion. The instant court gave minimal
weight to the historical quotations surrounding the Ten Commandments
monument and to the two secular plaques adorning the rotunda,77
concluding that none of these sufficiently detracted attention from the
religious aspect of the monument.7" The instant court focused instead on
its appearance and location.79 The instant court, therefore, concluded that
the monument's effect was that of state endorsement of Christianity."0
Distinguishing Lynch, the instant court noted that each figure in the
Christmas display had its own focal point, thereby mitigating the religious
meaning of the nativity scene." However, like the Ten Commandments
monument, the nativity scene in Lynch was in a highly visible location and
was nearly life-size.82
Lastly, the instant court correctly recognized that Marsh is an
independent basis upon which to uphold a challenged action that fails the
Lemon test. 3 However, the instant court arguably misconstrued Marsh.
The instant court questioned whether there is an "unambiguous and

472 U.S. at 108-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. CompareGlassroth,335 F.3d at 1296-97, with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,681 n.6
(1984).
72. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6.
73. Glassroth,335 F.3d at 1296.
74. See id. at 1296-97 (quoting Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1301 (M.D. Ala.
2002)) (affirming district court's finding that a secular purpose was lacking because of Appellant's
belief that the monument represents more than a "'sort of... secular moral code').
75. See id.
76. Id.at 1297.
77. See supra text accompanying note 2.
78. See Glassroth,335 F.3d at 1297.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (distinguishing Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
82. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 706 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1297-98.
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unbroken history" of displaying religious symbols in judicial buildings."
Because it considered historical evidence only of religious displays, the
court conducted its analysis at the wrong level of abstraction."5 Instead, the
instant court should have followed the example of the Court in Lynch, and
explored
the history of government acknowledgement of religion and of
86
God.

Had the instant court generalized its inquiry, it might have validated the
monument's constitutionality.87 As both Marsh and Lynch indicated, the
government has long recognized the role of religion in American life.88
Additionally, Appellant presented evidence thatjudges throughout history
have acknowledged the moral foundation of the law and have relied upon
it in their decisions.8 9 Lastly, Appellant noted that depictions of the Ten
Commandments appear in several governmental buildings, specifically on
the East Portico of the United States Supreme Court Building, on the
entrance door to the United States Supreme Court's courtroom, and on the
Spirit of Justice statute in the United States Justice Department Building.9"
Marsh is a more appropriate basis for deciding the instant case than is
Lemon.9 The three-part Lemon test is premised upon the mistaken notion

84. Id. at 1298. The district court phrased the issue even more specifically, asking whether
"members of the Continental Congress displayed the Ten Commandments in their chambers."
Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
85. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-75 (focusing on the history of government acknowledgement
of religion); see also ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289,300 (6th Cir.
2001) (considering historical evidence of acknowledgements of God rather than evidence of
religious displays).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
87. The Court in Lynch upheld the constitutionality of the Christmas display primarily
because of its historical foundation. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Thus, had the
instant court engaged in a similar historical analysis, it likely would have found the monument
constitutional.
88. See supra notes 29 and 40 and accompanying text.
89. Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; see also Susan McPherson, Address, The Heartof
the Rhetoric: Legal Arguments Surrounding the Ten Commandments Monument in the Alabama
JudicialBuilding, 33 CuMB. L. REv. 647, 657 (2002/2003) (discussing how American law stems
from God's law, which is summarized in the Ten Commandments).
90. Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
91. "'[Tlhe meaning of the [Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to
historical practices and understandings."' Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). "[O]ur interpretation of the
Establishment Clause should 'compor[t] with what history reveals was the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees."' Id.
at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 673 (1984)) (second alteration in original). "'[Tihe line we must draw between the
permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the
understanding ofthe Founding Fathers."' Id.(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
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that the Establishment Clause mandates a wall of separation between
church and state. 2 As such, the Lemon test precludes the government from
recognizing the significance of religion as the basis for American law and
civil order in society. Furthermore, Lemon would likely invalidate many
of our nation's longstanding religious traditions, including the national
motto, "In God We Trust," its presence on our money, the opening of court
proceedings with reference to God, the declaration of Thanksgiving as a
holiday, and the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance.93
The Establishment Clause was instead designed to prohibit the
establishment of a national religion and to prevent discrimination among
sects." Indeed, Marsh comports with this interpretation of the First
Amendment, as it references historical practices and understandings.95
Several cases have emphasized the significance of history in interpreting
the Establishment Clause, consistently quoting Justice Holmes's aphorism
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic.""
The instant court's application of both Lemon and Marsh contributed
to the inconsistency and unpredictability associated with the Establishment
92. Justice Rehnquist noted that the purpose and effect parts of the Lemon test were inherited
from Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1(1947), and are therefore based upon "the same historical
deficiencies as the wall concept itself: they are in no way based on either the language or intent of
the drafters." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the wall metaphor is a "mistaken understanding of constitutional history."
Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Rehnquist concludes that "[t]he three-part test
represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine." Id. at 110
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority in Lynch also recognized that "the metaphor itself is not
a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between
church and state." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. Furthermore, Justice Brennan stated in Marsh that:
"[N]eutrality" and "separation" do not exhaust the full meaning of the
Establishment Clause .... It is indeed true that there are certain tensions inherent
in the First Amendment itself, or inherent in the role of religion and religious
belief in any free society, that have shaped the doctrine of the Establishment
Clause, and required us to deviate from an absolute adherence to separation and
neutrality.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 809 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S.
at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)) ("'[A] test for
implementing the protections of the Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency, would
invalidate longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause'). One view of why
these features of public life are held to be consistent with the Establishment Clause is that they have
lost true religious significance. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818.
94. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
96. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). Both Lee and Wallace quote Justice
Holmes. Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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CASE COMMENT

Clause.97 As it stands, the three-part Lemon test is not an adequate standard
for deciding Establishment Clause cases.98 Therefore, if the Supreme Court
continues to uphold Lemon, it should refine the test to align it more closely
with the underlying purpose of the First Amendment.9 Alternatively, the
Court may opt to examine future Establishment Clause cases in accordance
with Marsh. In either case, as Justice O'Connor has suggested, the Court
should strive to frame a principle that is supported by the history and
language of the First Amendment and capable of consistent application."°

97. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the 38 years since Everson our
Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified."); see also Elenore Cotter
Klingler, Case Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Endorsinga New Testfor Establishment Clause
Cases, 53 FLA. L. REV. 995, 1004 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court "has left the determination
of an appropriate test in doubt").
98. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although Lemon has not been
overruled, in at least two Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court has essentially ignored
it. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91. The Court has thus recognized its irrelevance
in some contexts. Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Additionally, in cases where the
Court has applied the Lemon test, the Court considerably loosened its requirements. See Lynch, 465
U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's commitment to Lemon, therefore, may only be
superficial. However, it is not clear why the Supreme Court has not abandoned Lemon. The
continued criticism surrounding the Lemon test could encourage courts to decide Establishment
Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring). In fact, the Court
has already developed several alternative tests. See supra note 10.
99. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Jesse H. Choper, Religion
in the Public Schools: A ProposedConstitutionalStandard,47 MINN. L. REv. 329,332-33 (1963)).
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